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Abstract
In this paper we provide models for characterizing the equilibrium swap
rates for two types of interest rate swaps.

The first is a fixed rate for

floating rate swap between a risky firm and a riskless institution.

The

second is a swap between two risky firms with an intermediary guaranteeing the
performance.

This swap is modeled as a cooperative game between the players

in the context of competitive intermediary services.

In specific, we deter-

mine the payoff space and invoke the Nash Bargaining solution for characterizing the equilibrium swap rates.

In addition to being descriptive of the

prevailing swap rates, our models can be used by intermediaries and firms to
determine equilibrium swap rates.

I.

Introduction
For more than a decade

swa~s

have been a popular financial tool available

to corporations seeking to alter their interest and/or exchange rate exposure.
With the growing popularity of swaps, the swap market has evolved not only in
terms of the availability of different types of swap instruments but also in
terms of the institutional arrangements for entering into swap contracts.
When swaps were initially introduced, swap contracts were directly negotiated
by the two counterparties.

Subsequently, intermediaries began to play a

significant role in swap contracts.

In many instances, the intermediary, in

addition to bringing the two counterparties together, would also guarantee the
performance of the counterparties to each other.

Either party to the contract

could then behave as if it were dealing with a riskless counterparty.

The

intermediaries were compensated for their services of providing the information to bring the two counterparties together and the guarantee of performance
of the counterparties in terms of the spreads they received.

Recently,

however, due to increased competition among intermediaries, the spreads have
been narrowing.!
In this paper we provide models for characterizing equilibrium rates for
two types of interest rate swaps.

The first is a fixed for floating rate swap

between a risky firm and a riskless intermediary.

The second is a fixed for

floating rate swap between two risky firms through a riskless intermediary.
The interest rate swap market has grown significantly since its beginning in
the early 80's and the total outstanding volume now exceeds a trillion
dollars.

The pricing of the interest-rate swap contracts or in other words

the setting of the fixed and floating rates that the counterparties pay each
other either directly or through an intermediary are influenced by many factors.

The factors include the prevailing rates in the financial markets, the

2

creditworthiness of counterparties and the institutional arrangements
underlying the contract.
The analysis of the pricing of interest-rate swaps has attracted attention
of many financial economists in the past.

Bicksler and Chen (1986) developed

an approach to price interest rate swaps in a stochastic interest rate
environment.

They considered a context where two default risk free counter-

parties contracied with each other directly.

In a recent paper, Cooper and

Mello (1991) explicitly accounted for the default risk in pricing of swaps.
In their scenario, the payor of floating rate is riskless while the payor of
fixed rate is risky.

Using the option pricing approach, they are able to

characterize the solution to the problem of pricing interest rate swaps in the
presence of default risk.
In this paper we characterize equilibrium swap rates when both the counterparties are risky.
analysis.

We also explicitly incorporate the intermediary in our

-

In particular, the intermediary operating in a competitive market

for services of intermediation provides a guarantee for the performance of the
counterparties to each other.
give-up name basis.

Most swap transactions are carried out on a

The counterparties to a swap can therefore find credit

and other information about each other.

Also, the process of arriving at the

swap rates can involve more than one round of negotiations.

The two counter-

parties may not always directly negotiate with each other but may deal with
each other only through an intermediary.

In both cases, however, they are

dealing with a nearly "full information• situation.

In this situation, the

final outcome depends on the mutual interaction among the firms interested in
a swap and the intermediary institution; each of whom can be assumed to be in
pursuit of its own self-interest.
Given this strategic interdependence, we have chosen to model this
situation using a game theoretic approach.

Our game theoretic solution to the
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swap problem provides the optimal swap rates that the two counterparties
acting in their own self interest will agree upon.

It is not our claim that

the actual process of pricing swap transactions is played out as a bargaining
game.

We do. however. believe that the agreed swap rates will be as if they

were an outcome of the bargaining game.

Given our assumptions. if the actual

rates did not conform to the game theoretic solution at least one of the counterparties would not agree to transact.

It is in this sense that we believe

our model to be descriptive of the observed swap rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
details of the economic setting we consider.

Section II provides the

Section III details the Nash

bargaining game and characterizes its solution.

Section IV concludes the

paper.
II.

The Economic Scenario
In this section we set out in detail the essential features of the econom-

ic context we analyze in this paper.

We begin by describing the capital

market context in which the players in the game operate.
role of the intermediary in the capital markets.

We then describe the

We also provide the details

of the possible actions available to each player and outline their payoffs and
objective functions.
A.

The Capital Market Context
There exist capital markets where all firms in the economy can raise both

fixed rate and floating rate funds.

In the capital markets considered here

all floating rates on funds borrowed will be indexed to the same "base" floating or stochastic rate.

R.

where -denotes a random variable.

for all firms. floating rates are quoted as

R+

In other words.

spread, where the spread is

determined at the time the debt/swap contract is entered into and remains
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constant through the life of the contract.

While this feature of the economic

context we consider does limit some flexibility, it allows us to minimize analytical complexity to a great extent.2

In practical terms this assumption

means that if for a particular firm, floating rate is priced off say LIBOR
then the floating rates for all other firms will also be priced off LIBOR.

In

other words, the rates on all floating rate debts will be perfectly correlated.
Within the context of such capital markets we will focus attention on two
firms whom we will call firm A and firm B.

We will consider a situation where

firm A currently has fixed rate debt outstanding and firm B has floating rate
debt outstanding.

At this time, however, firm A prefers to have a floating

rate liability and firm B prefers to have a fixed rate liability.

It is not

the purpose of our paper to delve into the reasons why firm A might desire
floating rate funds or firm B might desire fixed rate funds.

We take as given

the fact that these firms have their respective preferences.

Our goal is to

model the rates they would pay each other in case they do decide to enter into
a swap contract.
Since firm A desires floating rate funds and firm B desires fixed rate
funds, both of them could potentially obtain their desired type of funds in
the capital markets and retire their existing liabilities.3
there would be no necessity for a swap.

If they do,

Our analysis, however, allows for the

possibility that the prevailing structure of rates available to both firms
across floating and fixed _rate markets may be such that firm A may find it
advantageous not to directly issue floating rate debt in the capital market
and retire its existing fixed rate liability but keep the existing liability
and swap it for floating rate debt.

In the scenario we are considering a swap

will be feasible between firm A and firm B only if firm B also finds it
advantageous not to directly issue fixed rate debt in the capital market and
retire its existing liability but keep it and swap it for fixed rate debt.

s
In relation to the possible structures of prevailing rates in the capital
markets that we allow for, two issues need to be noted.

First, we do not

attempt to analyze or explain why such structures of rates might exist in the
capital markets.

We also do not enter the debate as to whether such a struc-

ture of rates may arise due to existence of arbitrage opportunities as postulated by Bicksler and Chen (1986) or due to market incompleteness as postulated by Smith, Smithson and Wakeman (1988).

Whatever may be the reason

underlying the existence such structure of rates, the purpose of our paper is
to provide insight into the process of rate negotiation in a swap if the
structure of rates makes one feasible and attractive.
Second, we assume that firm A has comparative advantage in fixed rate market whereas firm B has comparative advantage in the floating rate market.

As

an illustration of such comparative advantage, consider the rates shown in
Table 1.

These rates indicate that in the fixed rate market firm A can raise

funds at a rate 120 basis points lower than that available to firm B.

On the

other hand, firm A can raise funds in the floating rate market at a rate only
SO basis points lower than that available to firm B.

In this case, firm A has

a comparative advantage in the fixed rate market and firm B in the floating
rate market.

In the rest of the paper we will focus on situations where there

exists such a comparative advantage.
Insert Table 1 here
B.

Role of the Third Party
There exist institutions in the capital markets who participate in swap

activities.
of two types.

The participation of these institutions in swap activities can be
One, they could use their knowledge of the firms in the market

to bring firms A and B together where both firms could contract with each
other and the institution (Z) will stand as a guarantor of the performance of
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both counterparties in the swap transaction.

The service provided by Z there-

fore entails a riskless guarantee to each counterparty to the swap transaction.

In this case we will call Z to be functioning as an intermediary.

Alternatively, Z could participate in the swap transaction by entering into
the swap by itself.

In this case Z is in fact a counterparty.

assume that payments from Z to A are riskless.

Here too we

Note that this feature of our

analysis is the same as the one considered by Cooper and Mello (1991).

In

case of both these types of participation by Z in swap transactions, the swap
payments received by both firm A and B are riskless.
The intermediary charges a fee proportional to the amount of swap transaction.

The market for institutional services is assumed to be competitive.

This assumption ensures that all intermediaries would charge the same fee.
The intermediary collects his fee from the net cash flow that passes through
him between the two counterparties.

Since the payments made by the counter-

parties are risky, the cash flow received by the intermediary in the form of
his fee is also risky.

In the context of our model, therefore, this assump-

tion implies that in any swap transaction the payoffs to Z must have an exogenously fixed net present value.

The other implication of this assumption is

that both firm A and firm B have a wide choice of institutions.

Thus, if one

institution offers to bring A and B together and provide a performance guarantee and another institution offers to enter into the swap on its own account,
both firms will choose the better of the two offers.
C.

Actions and Contractual Payments
Given the capital market context and the availability of institutional

services described in subsections A and B above, we will provide here the
details of the actions available to firms A and B and the associated
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contractual payments.

Table 2 provides the actions available to and the con-

sequent contractual payments required of both firms A and B.
Insert Table 2 here
In the Table 2:

F~

denotes the payment required to be made by firm A on fixed rate debt
raised in the market.
denotes the fixed rate payment required to be made by A when a swap
is entered into with Z as a counterparty.

F~

denotes the fixed rate payment required to be made by A when a swap
is entered into with Z as an intermediary.

Y!

denotes the floating rate payment required to be made by A to the
investors in the market.

~

denotes the floating rate payment required to be made by A when a
swap is entered into with Z as a counterparty.

~

denotes the floating rate payment required to be made by A when a
swap is entered with Z as an intermediary.

&!

denotes the spread over
pay

A
&zA and &s.

Also, analogous definitions hold

Without loss of generality, we assume firm A to be more

creditworthy than firm B.

This implies:

A

~ < F~
J
(1)

A agrees to pay when it contracts to

Y!.

Analogous definitions hold for
for firm B.

R that

j •

m,

Z

or S

j •

m,

Z

or S

and
-A

-B

~ < Yj

alternatively,
A
~ < &~
J

j

• m,

Z or S.
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The maturity of the debt and swap contracts considered here is one period.

-B
A B ~A
This implies that Fj, Fj, Yj- and Yj are terminal payouts consisting of both
principal and interest.
We assume that both firms A and B will seek to maximize the values of
their respective shareholders' wealth.

The value of shareholders' equity is,

however, equal to the value of a call option on the firm value with the exercise price of the call being the payment to debt holders or the gross payment
to swap counterparties.

The values of shareholders' wealth as a consequence

of each of the six actions listed in Table 2 for both firms A and B are · given
by:

Wx(F~)
(2)

• C(Vx,

F~)

j • m, Z or S and K • A or B

• c(vx,

~>

j • m, Z, or S and K • A or B.

and

Wx(Y~)
where

denotes the value of the shareholders' wealth for firm K when it

K
contracts to make payment Fj.
denotes the value of the shareholders' wealth of firm K when it

-K
contracts to make payment Yj.
Vx

denotes the value of the firm K.

K denotes the value of a call option on firm value Vx with the
C(Vx,Fj)
exercise price

FJ.

C(Vx,~) denotes the value of a call option on firm value Vx with a
stochastic exercise price

YJ.

The institution Z on its own part simply tries to ensure that the present value
of all the cash flows received by itself is equal to the fixed fee it receives
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as described earlier.

This follows directly from the assumption of perfect

competition in the market for institutional services.
In the next section we provide the formal model of the swap process.
III.

Swap Bargaining Games
As discussed in subsection A of section II above, firm A has fixed rate

debt outstanding but desires to have a floating rate liability while firm B
has floating rate debt outstanding but desires to have a fixed rate liability.
The firms then have a choice of either swapping with Z as counterparty, or
swapping with each other with Z as intermediary or not swapping at all.
are three swaps possible in this situation:

Firm A could swap with Z, firm B

could swap with Z, and both firms could swap with each other through Z.
B's swap with Z has been analyzed by Cooper and Mello (1991).
remaining two.

There

Firm

We analyze the

In the rest of this section we provide formal models of both

these swaps.
A.

Firm A's Swap with Z
In this case, firm A has issued fixed rate debt in the market and has

A

agreed to pay Fm·

A will then swap with

z.

A
Z pays firm A riskless amount Fm•

Firm A, in return, will agree to pay Z a floating rate ~ • R+ &~.
problem is to determine a fair
given in Table 3.

A
&z.

Our

The payoffs to both parties.A and Z are

Following Cooper and Mellow (1991), we assume that the swap

contract is a contract for the net cash flows due in the swap, and not for an
exchange of gross amounts.

Swaps are also assumed to be subordinate to debt

in bankruptcy.
Insert Table 3 here
Insert Figure 1 here
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B~ are the cash flows to the bondholders of A if it issued fixed rate
debt at rate

F~ and swapped it with Z for floating rate debt at rate ~.

are the cash flows to equity holders of A in the same scenario.
cash flows to Z.

E~

Z~ are the

CM(VA,~, F~) is the value of the call option on the minimum

.
FA
of VA an d -A
Yz wi th exerc i se pr1ce
m·
on ~ with exercise price F~.

-A A
P(Yz,Fm) is the value of the put option

Payoffs to Z are the same as those to a port-

folio CM(VA,~,F~)- P(~,F:!>, i.e., buy a call on the minimum of VA andY~
with exercise price F! and write a put on

~ with exercise price Fm·

Given

perfect competition in the market for institutional services Z will set

Y~ •

R + &~,

such that4

CM(VA,~,F!> - P(~,F!) • P • Value of Z~ • Fixed fee.

(3)

As discussed before equation (3) just restates the implication of perfect
competition in the market for institutional services.

Let ~ (or &~) be the

A the payoff to debt
solution to (3) and denote by BF
holders of firm A before
the swap.

The following Lemma then shows that the debt holders of firm A will

be better off after the swap.
Lemma 1:
Proof:

Value of

B~

> Value of

B~

From the table above notice that the payoffs in B~ are identical to

those in B~ except in state three where the payoffs are:

Hence, Value of

B~

> Value of

B~.

Since the total value of the firm remains constant, Lemma 1 above must
imply that shareholders lose the value that is gained by the debt holders.

In
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other words, there is wealth transfer from shareholders to debt holders.
Proposition I below formalizes this intuition.
Proposition I:
Proof:

Follows directly from Lemma 1 and the discussion above.

It is clear that a swap entails a loss in wealth to the shareholders.

The

incentive of the shareholders to enter into a swap then lies in the fact that
they desire floating rate funds.

Presumably in some other aspect of the

firm's operations there are benefits to be derived from floating rate funds.
These are the benefits that give rise to the desire for floating rate funds in
the first place.

Firm A, therefore, would enter into a swap transaction if

the benefits to be derived from having floating rate funds are greater than
the loss to shareholder wealth from the swap transaction.
B.

Swap Between A and B through Z
We now turn our attention to the case where both firms A and B could

engage into an interest rate swap arrangement.

In this case the firm A has

issued fixed rate debt while it desires floating rate funds.

The firm B, on

the other hand, has issued floating rate debt while its real desire is to
obtain fixed rate funds.

The firms A and B, therefore, could arrange an

interest rate swap with each other through Z as the intermediary.
Such a swap arrangement will become a reality only if all the parties
involved are satisfied with the details of the contractual arrangement.

In

specific, the following conditions must be true:
(1) the firms A and Bare agreeable to the swap rates, i.e., the floating rate
that the firm A pays, and the fixed rate that the firm B pays;
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(2) the intermediary Z is adequately compensated for the services it provides,
in bringing together the right parties and in providing the guarantee for
payment of interest from one party to another.
If in case the above conditions are not met, the firms A and B may still be
interested in swap arrangements.

But then they will have to consider two sep-

arate swaps with Z as the counterparty.

Thus, firm A may enter into a swap

arrangement with Z which is distinct and independent of the swap arrangement
that firm B may reach with Z.
Insert Figure 2 here
The above description evidently deals with a situation of strategic interdependence in which the outcome depends on the mutual interaction between
rational players; each of whom pursuing its own interests.

This is clearly a

situation where the game theoretic approach is appropriate and beneficial.s
Moreover, since the swaps are brokered on a "give-up" name basis the situation
clearly allows for communication between parties and involves full information
bargaining between parties to reach suitable binding arrangements.

Hence, in

this subsection, we formulate a . cooperative game model to the interest rate
swap.

In specific, we propose two-person bargaining game between firms A and

B, where the role of intermediary Z is captured in terms of the conditions it
imposes on the swap rates.
As we discussed in subsection B above, the market for intermediary services is competitive.

This competition ensures that the NPV of the cash flows

to Z is equal to the fixed fee
encounters.

~.

Figure 2 shows the cash flows that

z

Notice that the NPV of cash flows related to A is represented by

the L.H.S. of equation (3) above.

Similarly, the NPV of cash flows related to

B is captured by the L.H.S. of the analogous equation developed by Cooper and
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Mello (1991) and restated in equation 3A in footnote 4.

Thus, the NPV of Z's

cash flows with both A and B is obtained by summing the L.H.S. 's of 3 and 3A.
That is:

where:

-B
Fs
-A

Ys

B and
is the value of a default risk free claim on Fg,
-A

is the value of a default risk free claim on Ys

-A
B
PX(VB•
Yg,
Fg)
is the value of a put option on the maximum of VB
and

Ts

~_A

B

with exercise price equal to Fs.
is the NPV of the fee Z charges for the swap.
The above equation has two unknowns, viz. F~ and ~. and defines a relation
between them.

Obviously, if one rate decreases the other must increase to

ensure that equation (4) holds, i.e., NPV is equal toP.

Equation (4) in fact

defines the set of feasible swap rates as depicted by curve SS in Figure 3.
In the appendix we provide conditions necessary for curve SS to be convex.
It is interesting to note that one specific pair of swap rates on curve SS,
denoted by point Q will also simultaneously satisfy the conditions imposed by
equation (3) and (3A) in footnote 4.
equation (4) but not (3) and (3A).

All points on SS other than Q do satisfy
In equation (4) the NPV shortfall caused

by lowering one rate is compensated by excess due to increasing the other
rate.

Since Z is indifferent between all points on the curve SS, it defines

the feasible set of swap rates for A and B to negotiate upon.

The process of

negotiation that leads to the specific pair of swap rates acceptable to both A
and B is modeled below.
Insert Figure 3 here
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Prior to the stage where the bargaining game is played, firms A and B have
identified the ideal way of raising funds in the capital market using the
process described in subsection A.

Thus, the shareholder wealth positions of

firms when they begin the game are:

A for firm A
-B for firm B.
WA(Fm)
and WB(Ym)

A
-B
The initial shareholder wealth levels WA(Fm)
and WB(Ym) are represented by
point 0 in Figure 4.

Note that point 0 is on the inside of the straight line

representing the aggregate firm value (VA+VB).

The difference between the

aggregate firm value and the sum of the shareholder wealth levels WA<F!> +

-B represented at point 0 is the sum wealths of
WB(Ym)
bondholders of firms A and
those of firm B.

To clarify the relation between curve nn and point 0 let us

refer back to curve SS in Figure 3.

As we discussed earlier, each point on

curve SS represents a pair of feasible swap rates

(~, F~).

Corresponding to

~_A
B _A
~_A
B -B
each such pair exist shareholder wealth levels WA(Tg,Fg,FJii)
and WB(Tg,Fg,Ym>·

Each point on curve nn in Figure 4 therefore represents shareholder wealth
levels corresponding to a pair of feasible swap rates.
labeled the Payoff Space.

Curve nn is hence

It is clear that the sum (WA + WB), where we have

suppressed the arguments of WA and WB for expositional convenience, correspending to any point on curve nn is less than the sum of the shareholder
wealths represented by point 0.
declines after the swap.

The aggregate shareholder wealth therefore

This is a consequence of Lemma 1 and the analogous

Lemma of Cooper and Mello (1991).
Insert Figure 4 here
The goal of the bargaining process is to choose a suitable point on the
curve nn as the final outcome that is acceptable to both the parties.
clarity, we have redrawn the payoff space of Figure 4 as Figure 5.

For

In devel-

oping the bargaining game model, we need to describe what happens in case of
conflict, i.e., when the firms cannot arrive at an agreement on the final
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outcome.

In conflict situation the firms will act on their own in achieving

their individual objectives.

This means that firm A will compare two options:

(1) arranging independently for a swap with Z as the counterparty to convert
its fixed rate obligation into a floating rate obligation, or (2) directly
raise floating fund in the marketplace and liquidate the fixed rate debt.
firm A will then naturally choose the better alternative of these two.

The

Thus,

the firm A's wealth in case of conflict is given by
WA • Conflict Payoff of Firm A

With similar arguments we can determine the wealth of B in case of conflict as
WB • Conflict Payoff of Firm·B

Referring to Figure 5, we can see that the conflict payoffs, WA and WB, put
further constraints on the payoff space.

The principle of individual ratio-

nality dictates that no firm may agree to a final outcome where the payoff it
receives is less than the conflict payoff.

Hence, we are left with the

segment pq as the undominated set of payoffs.

In determining the final

payoff, we may only pay attention to this set.
Insert Figure 5 here
The line segment pq may also be seen as the Pareto set since it is not
possible to move from one point to another point on the segment while simultaneously improving the wealth of both parties.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern

(1947) called this the negotiation set and argued that the entire segment pq
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should be seen as the cooperative solution to the game.

From a practical

viewpoint, however, one needs to restrict the solution to a single point.
John Nash (1950, 1953) proposed the first, and arguably the most significant, unique solution to a two-person bargaining game.

The Nash model is

based on four postulates that embody certain notions of fairness and reasonableness.

Based on these postulates of joint efficiency, symmetry, linear

invariance and independence of irrelevant alternatives, Nash proves the
existence and the uniqueness of the solution (see Luce and Raiffa (1957) and
Harsanyi (1977)).
In our present situation, this solution,

w* •

(WA, WB), is obtained by

solving the following maximization problem:
(P1)
S.T.

W E Negotiation Set

Another way of defining (P1) follows.

Let H(WA,WB) • 0 be the equation

of segment pq representing the negotiation set.

Let HA and HB be the first

partial derivatives of H with respect to WA and WB.

Using the Lagrangian

multipliers we can see that the maximization problem of (Pl) is equivalent to
H(WA, WB) • 0
(P2)

* - -WA) - HB(WB* - WB)
HA(WA

which give a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution (see
Harsanyi (1977)).
Having found the solution W* • (WA,
* WB)
* that is acceptable to both A and
B, the next step is to solve for underlying swap rates, ~ and Ft such that
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and

Thus, ~ and F~ are the equilibrium swap rates that we expect will be
agreeable to A, B and Z, when firm A swaps with B through the intermediary
IV.

z.

Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed two type·s of interest rate swap transac-

tions.

The first, which is an extension of Cooper and Mello (1991) approach,

is the swap between a firm and a riskless intermediary where the firm has
issued floating rate debt and swaps it for fixed rate debt.
the equilibrium swap rate in this case.

We characterize

The second, which is more complex and

therefore more interesting, is the swap between two risky firms arranged
through an intermediary that guarantees the performance of both parties to
each other.

The equilibrium swap rate in this case depends on the strategic

interaction between the two firms and the intermediary.

Given this strategic

interdependence, we model this swap as a Nash Bargaining Game and characterize
the solution to it.
A swap rate defines the cash flows passing through the intermediary to and
from the firms.

We identify the condition implied by the competitive nature

of the market for intermediary services.
the set of feasible swap rates.

This competitivity condition defines

Each of the feasible swap rates, in turn,

determine the shareholder wealth levels for both firms.
space in the firms' bargaining game.

This is the payoff

The actions available to the firms in

case of a disagreement as to the final outcome give us the conflict payoffs.
Given the payoff space and the conflict payoffs we apply the Nash bargaining
solution procedure to arrive at the equilibrium swap rate.

Since the

equilibrium swap rate is an optimal outcome of the game, any other swap rate
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would be unacceptable to at least one of the parties.

The observed swap

rates, therefore would be consistent with our model.

In addition to being

descriptive of the prevailing swap rates in the market, our model can be used
by the intermediaries to quote the rates that are likely to be acceptable to
the firms, and by the firms to choose the rates best suited for them.
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Footnotes
lsee Stigum (1990) for a summary of the workings of swap markets.

Also,

see Arnold (1984).
2If we allowed for debts to be priced off two different base rates such as
"T-bill rate" and "LIBOR," then we will need to consider the correlation between . the two rates.
3our formal analysis assumes that the existing liabilities could be
retired with zero cost.

The analysis. however, can be easily modified to

account for non-zero cost.
4This condition is analogous to equation (4) in Cooper and Mello (1991).
We restate below their equation (4) in our notation for later reference in our
paper.
-B
-B
-B
B
Fs - Ym - PX(VB, Ym, Fs) • 0

(3A)

-B
where Fs is the value of a default risk free claim on Fs and Ym is the value
of a default risk free claim on

Y:.

-B Fs)
B is the value of a put
PX(YB,
Ym,

~
B
option on the maximum of -VB and Ym
with exercise price equal to Fg.

Sin cases where one of the parties to the swap is a passive intermediary,
there is no strategic interdependence and hence there is no necessity of a
game theoretic approach.

Therefore, in our fixed for floating rate swap model

in section A above, and the floating for fixed rate swap model analyzed by
Cooper and Mello (1991), it was not necessary to use a game theoretic
approach.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we examine the conditions on parameter values that ensure
the convexity of payoff space.

Convexity is ensured by the condition,
d2wA<Y!> <
dWB(F!) 2

o

Taking the total derivative of equation (4) in the text, we get

-

(A-1)

Hence:
(A-2)

d2wA<Y!>
dWB(F!)2

-

which becomes

(A-3)

8~
. -.

dFBs

8F:

dWB(F:)

s

We will analyze each of the three terms in (A-3) above separately.
Consider the first term in equation (A-3).
Since, WA<Y!> • C(VA•
exercise price:

(A-4)

¥!>,

using the formula for a call option with stochastic

21
and
A

1 • Ys·R-1. R-1
OA
VA
VA

(A-5)

This implies that the first term in (A-3) is negative.
Consider the second term in equation (A-3).

(A-6)

It can be shown that

- -dY! .
dFB

s

and that

(A-7)
Hence:

a
. -.
a~

(A-8)

s

1

~ > 0 as shown in Stultz (1982)
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131 • Y2 + OB

We will use the total derivative of equation (4) in text to obtain

dYA
s
dFBs

But first, we will use the results provided in Stulz (1982) to simplify it to
the following:

(A-9)

-R B
e Fs

Further simplification yields:

(A-10)

Taking the total derivative of this expression yields
(A-ll)

where the last inequality follows from the fact that A1 > 0.
Hence, in equation (A-8) if

.

(A-12)

a~s
+8FBs

then the second term in equation (A-3) is negative.
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Consider the third term in equation (A-3)

(A-13)
and
(A-14)

The terms on the R.H.S. of (A-14) are clearly positive, and (A-13) are clearly
negative.

Thus, using (A-4) and (A-ll) it is clear that the third term in

equation (A-3) is always negative.

The appendix above characterizes the con-

ditions for the convexity of payoff space.

24
References
Arnold, T., 1984, "How to do interest rate swaps," Harvard Business Review.
Bicksler, J. and A. H. Chen, 1986, "An economic analysis of interest rate
swaps," The Journal of Finance, 41.
Cooper, I. and A. Mello, 1991, "The Default Risk of Swaps," The Journal of
Finance, 46.
Harsanyi, J., 1977, Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and
social situations, Cambridge University Press.
Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa, 1957, Games and Decisions, John Wiley and Sons,
Inc.
Nash, J., 1950, "The bargaining problem," Econometrica, 18.
Nash, J., 1953, "Two-person cooperative games," Econometrica, 21.
Smith, C., C. W. Smithson and L. M. Wakeman, 1988, "The market for interest
rate swaps," Financial Management.
Stigum, M. , 1990, The Money Market, Dow Jones Irwin.
Stulz, R., 1982, "Options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets,"
Journal of Financial Economics, 10.

TABLE 1

Fixed and Floating Rates
Firm

A

B

Cost of
Fixed
Rate Funds

10.80%

12.00%

Cost of
Floating
Rate Funds

8.25%

8.75%

TABLE 2

Interest Obligations of Firms
Rate for
Action

A

1.

Raise fixed rate debt in market

~

2.

Raise floating rate debt in market

~m • -R

3.

Raise floating rate in market and
swap with z·as counterparty for
fixed rate

4.

Raise fixed rate in market and
swap with Z as counterparty for
floating rate

5.

Raise floating rate in market and
swap through Z as intermediary for
fixed rate

6.

Raise fixed rate in market and
swap through Z as intermediary for
floating rate

B

A
+ 6m

Tz - R +

~_A

-

Sz

~_A

-

sA8

Ts - R +

FB
m
B
-B
Ym • ii + 6m

A

-B

-

B

Yz - R + 68

TABLE 3

Cash Flows to Swap Participants at the Swap Maturity
State

B~

E~

z~

C(VA,~)

A~
VA>Fm>
Z

FA
ro

VA-~

-(~-~)

VA-~

0

A~
FroZ

A
~
Fm>VA>
Z

~·

VA-~

-(~-~)

VA-~

0

A~
FroZ

0

A~
-(Froz)

0

0

A -A
Fm-Yz

A~
Fm>
z>VA

A~
VA+FroZ

A
CM(VA, ~z,Fro)

A
P( ~Z• Fro)

A
VA> ~
z>Fm

FA

m

VA-~

~-~

VA-~

A
Yz-Fm

0

~
A
z>VA>Fro

FA
m

0

A
VA-Fm

0

A
VA-Fm

0

-A A
Yz>Fm>VA

VA

0

0

0

0

0

AmountFm

A

the Market Fixed

Pays Investors in

Swap Cash Flow

AmountVz as

z

A

Floating

Intermediary

Swap Cash Flow

Firm

-

A

F1xed Amount Fm as

,

Receives Riskless

A Swaps with Z

FIGURE 1·

Fm

A

Amount

Fixed

Pays
Swap Cash Flow

z

A
Contracts to Pay Floating
-A
AmountYs as

Intermediary

Firm

Cash Flow

Fm as Swap

A

Fixed Amount

Receives Riskless

a

Swap Cash Flow

Amount Fs as

Contracts to Pay Fixed

Flow

Ym as Swap Cash

-a

Floating Amount

Receives Riskless

A Swaps with B through Z

FIGURE 2

B

Firm

Ym

-a

Amount

Floating

Pays

FIGURE 3
Feasible Swap Rates

s

· B

Fs

s

FIGURE 4
Feasible Wealth Levels

Wealth ofB
Wa

-a

Wa(Y m)

-------------------------.0

f

~Payoff

:
I
I

I

n

Wealth of A
WA

Space

FIGURE 5

Bargaining Game

n

Nash Solution
Wealth of B

*
Wa t----+--------~

*

Wa
n

Wealth of A

Note:

The following is a partial list of papers that are
currently available in the Edwin L. Cox School of
Business Working Paper Series. When requesting a
paper, please include the Working Paper number as
well as the title and author(s), and enclose payment of $2.50 per copy made payable to SMU. A
complete list is available upon request from:
Business Information Center
Edwin L. Cox School of Business
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas 75275

90-011

"Organizational Subcultures in a Soft Bureaucracy:
Resistance Behind the Myth and Facade of an
Official Culture," by John M. Jermier, John w.
Slocum, Jr., Louis w. Fry, and Jeannie Gaines

90-021

"Global Strategy and Reward Systems: The Key
Roles of Management Development and Corporate
Culture," by David Lei, John W. Slocum, Jr., and
Robert W. Slater

90-071

"Multiple Niche Competition - The Strategic Use of
CIM Technology," by David Lei and Joel D. Goldhar

90-101

"Global Strategic Alliances," by David Lei and
John W. Slocum, Jr.

90-102

"A Theoretical Model of Household Coupon Usage
Behavior And Empirical Test," by Ambuj Jain and
Arun K. Jain

90-103

"Household's Coupon Usage Behavior: Influence
of In-Store Search," by Arun K. Jain and Ambuj
Jain

90-121

"Organization Designs for Global Strategic Alliances," by John w. Slocum, Jr. and David Lei

91-011

"Option-like Properties of Organizational Claims:
Tracing the Process of Multinational Exploration,"
by Dileep Hurry

91-071

"A Review of the Use and Effects of Comparative
Advertising," by Thomas E. Barry

91-091

"Global Expansion and the Acquisition Option:
Process of Japanese Takeover Strategy in the
United States," by Dileep Hurry

91-092

"Designing Global Strategic Alliances: Integration of Cultural and Economic Factors," by
John w. Slocum, Jr. and David Lei

91-101

"The Components of the Change in Reserve Value:
New Evidence on SFAS No. 69," by Mimi L. Alciatore

91-102

"Asset Returns, Volatility and the Output Side,"
by G. Sharathchandra

91-121

"Pursuing Product Modifications and New Products:
The Role of Organizational Control Mechanisms in
Implementing Innovational Strategies in the
Pharmaceutical Industry," by Laura B. Cardinal

The

92-101

"Management Practices in Learning Organizations,"
by Michael McGill, John W. Slocum, Jr., and David
Lei

92-031

"The Determinants of LBO Activity: Free Cash
Flow Vs. Financial Distress Costs," by Tim Opler

92-032

"A Model of Supplier Responses to Just-In-Time
Delivery Requirements," by John R. Grout and
David P. Christy

92-033

"An Inventory Model of Incentives for On-Time
Delivery in Just-In-Time Purchasing Contracts,"
by John R. Grout and David P. Christy

92-034

"The Effect of Early Resolution of Uncertainty on
Asset Prices: A Dichotomy into Market and NonMarket Information," by G. Sharathchandra and Rex
Thompson

92-035

"Conditional Tests of a Signalling Hypothesis:
The Case of Fixed Versus Adjustable Rate Debt,"
by Jose Guedes and Rex Thompson

92-036

"Tax-Loss-Selling and Closed-End Stock Funds," by
John w. Peavy III

92-041

"Hostile Takeovers and Intangible Resources:
Empirical Investigation," by Tim c. Opler

92-042

"Morality and Models," by Richard 0. Mason

92-051

"Global Outsourcing of Information Processing
Services," by Uday M. Apte and Richard o. Mason

92-052

"Improving Claims Operations: A Model-Based
Approach," by Uday M. Apte, Richard A. Cavaliere,
and G. G. Hegde

92-053

92-061

An

"Corporate Restructuring and The Consolidation of
Industry," by Julia Liebeskind, Timothy c.
Opler, and Donald E. Hatfield

u.s.

"Catalog Forecasting System: A Graphics-Based
Decision Support System," by David v. Evans and
Uday M. Apte

